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ABSTRACT

RETROACTIVE INTERFERENCE IN RECOGNITION MEMORY: THE EFFECTS
MENTAL EFFORT AND SIMILARITY ON RECOLLECTION AND FAMILIARITY
By
Caleb Jordan Picker
Dr. Colleen Parks, Examination Committee Chair
Assistant Professor of Psychology
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Learning new material may retroactively interfere with memory for older material.
Retroactive interference research has typically focused on how similarity between old
and new material affects recall of old material, which predicts greatest interference when
similar material is presented just before test. However, mental effort may be another
source of retroactive interference that could disrupt consolidation: Mental effort could
cause the most retroactive interference when presented just after study. In Experiment 1,
participants engaged in tasks designed to induce mental effort (e.g., solving easy or
difficult math problems) at various times between the study and test of an associative
recognition task. Although familiarity estimates were unaffected, the timing of mental
effort affected recollection estimates. In Experiment 2, participants engaged in a different
set of tasks designed to induce mental effort (e.g., solving easy or difficult anagrams) and
increase similarity. Again, familiarity estimates were unaffected; however, mental effort
marginally affected recollection estimates, but in a way that was inconsistent with
expectations. The results showed inconsistent mental effort effects overall, consistent
with some past research showing that mental effort may not always cause retroactive
interference. The results also highlight the importance of a deeper investigation of
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retroactive interference effects in recognition memory.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Retroactive interference occurs when new material learned during the retention
interval of a memory test decreases memory for old material. Retroactive interference can
be item-specific or nonspecific. Item-specific RI occurs when there is a strong
correspondence between old and new material—for example, learning ‘apple’ interferes
with learning ‘pear’. Item-specific retroactive interference increases with the similarity
between old and new materials (for reviews, see M. C. Anderson et al., 1994 and M. C.
Anderson, 2003; cf. McGeoch, 1942). Non-specific retroactive interference occurs when
there is little to no correspondence between old and new material. This nonspecific
retroactive interference is thought to increase with the mental effort associated with
learning new material or with decreasing the delay between learning old and new
material.(Dewar, Cowan, & Della Sala, 2007; Lechner, Squire, & Byrne, 1999; Müller &
Pilzecker, 1900; Skaggs, 1925, 1933; Wixted, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2010). Past research
found an inverted-U relationship between recall of old material and the timing of learning
new material, supporting the view that mental effort and similarity cause retroactive
interference in different ways (Wixted, 2004b). However, retroactive interference usually
has been measured with recall tasks: Few experiments have investigated retroactive
interference in recognition memory (but see Heine, 1914, as cited in McKinney, 1935).
The current study investigated the effects of mental effort and similarity on recognition
memory performance.
The current literature review will focus on mental effort and similarity. The first
section will introduce early research on mental effort. The second section will discuss
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recent neurological research on mental effort. The third section will discuss early and
recent research on similarity. The fourth section will discuss recognition memory
research, linking mental effort and similarity effects to recognition memory processes.
Mental Effort as Retroactive Interference
Mental effort is the subjective state of mental demand that occurs while learning
new material or while engaged in nonspecific tasks (Dewar et al., 2007; Müller &
Pilzecker, 1900). In general, mental effort decreases memory performance: Early
research found worse recall after a “filled” period of mental effort (e.g. solving
multiplication problems) than after a relatively “unfilled” period of rest (Baldwin & Shaw,
1895; Calkins, 1896; DeCamp, 1915; Lechner et al., 1999; Lewy, 1895; Müller &
Pilzecker, 1900; Münsterberg & Campbell, 1894; Skaggs, 1925; Warren & Shaw, 1895),
suggesting that mental effort causes RI.
. Early research also found a nonlinear relationship between recall and the timing
of learning new material (see Figure 1)—the temporal point of interpolation (TPI):
Participants had worse memory when new material was learned just after study and just
before test, but they had better recall when new material was learned midway between
study and test (Archer & Underwood, 1951; Newton & Wickens, 1956; Postman & Alper,
1946; Sisson, 1939; Wixted, 2004b). This temporal gradient of retroactive interference is
consistent with the view that there are two sources of retroactive interference, mental
effort that disrupts consolidation and similarity that affects retrieval (for discussion of
similarity, see section titled “Similarity and Response Competition”).
One idea that has been closely tied to retroactive interference is consolidation.
Consolidation refers to a process that stabilizes memories. Evidence for consolidation
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comes from Ebbinghaus’s forgetting curve (1885/1913), which plots amount of forgotten
material over time. Mathematical descriptions of this forgetting curve suggest that that
the proportion of material forgotten continually decreases over time (Wixted & Ebbesen,
1991; Wixted, 2004a). This is consistent with the view that consolidation increasingly
protects memories from retroactive interference over time. Thus, more consolidated
memories should be less susceptible to RI than less consolidated memories. Similarly,
retroactive interference should affect memory more when presented just after study (less
consolidation) compared to a delay (more consolidation).
Two laws of forgetting may reflect two sides of the same ‘consolidation’ coin
(Wixted, 2004b): First, Jost’s Law (the second tenet) holds that, given two memories of
equal strength, the newer memory will decay more rapidly than the older memory.
Second, Ribot’s law holds that hippocampal damage causes temporally graded retrograde
amnesia, that is, worse memory for newer than older memories (e.g., Nadel &
Moscovitch, 1997, 2001). Thus, the hippocampus may consolidate memories: Newer
memories may have consolidated less than older memories. Therefore, disrupting
consolidation—by retroactive interference or by hippocampus damage —should affect
newer memories more than older memories.
Müller and Pilzecker (1900, for review, see Lechner et al., 1999), in their original
theory of RI, proposed that mental effort disrupts consolidation. First, they noticed that
memories come to mind as afterimages after participants learn material, especially within
the first 5 minutes after study. These uncued and spontaneous remindings were thought to
consolidate memories and strengthen associations between them. Second, they found that
mental effort made memory worse compared to rest (Müller & Pilzecker, 1900, as cited
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in Lechner et al., 1999). Third, and more importantly, mental effort made memory worse
when presented shortly after study than when delayed, demonstrating a temporal gradient
of nonspecific retroactive interference (i.e., mental effort). As noted earlier, this temporal
gradient was replicated in other studies (Wixted, 2004b). Therefore, mental effort was
thought to disrupt the occurrence of uncued remindings that facilitated consolidation
(Lechner et al., 1999; Wixted, 2004a, 2004b)
Some early research did not support theory about mental effort (McGeoch &
McDonald, 1931; Robinson, 1920, 1927). In some cases, mental effort did not decrease
recall relative to rest: Only learning similar materials decreased recall (e.g. Robinson,
1920). In other cases, the temporal gradient of retroactive interference was not found
(Wixted, 2004b). Unfortunately, these early mental effort experiments were flawed or
had confounds (Skaggs, 1933; Wixted, 2004b): Participants read newspapers or spoke
with the experimenter during unfilled conditions, likely inducing some degree of mental
effort (McGeoch & McDonald, 1931; Robinson, 1920), and participants could have
rehearsed old material more in unfilled than in filled conditions. Additionally, some
studies only used two points of TPI when at least three points are necessary to find
temporal effects (Wixted, 2004b). When considered with the experiments reviewed
earlier, these limitations warrant further investigation of mental effort as a source of
retroactive interference that disrupts consolidation (Wixted, 2004b).
Is Mental Effort New Learning?
One way the hippocampus could consolidate memory is through long-term
potentiation, a resource-dependent (e.g. protein synthesis) synaptic plasticity mechanism
that enhances neuronal communication (Dudai, 2004; Hebb, 1949). Over several hours,
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long-term potentiation transitions between early and late phases, which could help
convert memory from short-term to long-term storage (Dudai, 2004). Wixted (2004b)
proposed that consolidation is a constant force that increasingly hardens memories from
retroactive interference over time and can thus account for the shape of forgetting curves
over longer timescales (Bahrick, 1984, as cited in Wixted, 2010). Thus, the temporal
transitions in long-term potentiation are consistent with the temporal gradient of
retroactive interference, suggesting that older memories are more likely to be
consolidated (old long-term potentiation) and stored in long-term memory than newer
memories (new long-term potentiation).
Wixted’s (2004b) theory of retroactive interference states that old and new longterm potentiation compete for limited physiological resources in the hippocampus: He
hypothesized that mental effort is new learning that preferentially leads to new long-term
potentiation over old long-term potentiation in the hippocampus. It should be noted that
long-term potentiation happens in other brain regions. However, long-term potentiation in
the hippocampus could be especially important for consolidation of declarative memory
(see section “Retroactive Interference in Recognition Memory”). Indeed, there is a long
history of research demonstrating the link between the hippocampus and declarative
memory (Scoville & Milner, 1957; Warrington, 1968; Yonelinas, 2002). For example,
performance in recall tasks or tasks that increase demands on recall-like processes
depends on hippocampal integrity. Three lines of evidence support Wixted’s theory of
retroactive interference.
First, there is some evidence to support the idea that mental effort disrupts
consolidation in the hippocampus (Wixted, 2004a). If the hippocampus is critical for
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consolidation, then mental effort should disrupt consolidation more in patients with
damage to the hippocampus than in healthy controls. One group of patients who have
damage including the hippocampus are amnestic mild cognitive impaired patients. Indeed,
compared to controls, these patients show larger mental effort effects that are also
temporally graded (Dewar, Della Sala, Beschin, & Cowan, 2010; Dewar, Garcia, Cowan,
& Della Sala, 2009), consistent with the hypothesis that mental effort disrupts
consolidation in the hippocampus—at least for the recall memory tested in these
experiments. However, this conclusion is limited because amnestic mild cognitive
impaired patients could have damage that extends to extra-hippocampal regions (Dewar,
Pesallaccia, Cowan, Provinciali, & Della Sala, 2012).
Second, there is some evidence to support the idea that decreasing new long-term
potentiation in the hippocampus retroactively facilitates memory (Wixted, 2004b). When
a group of participants received midazolam—a benzodiazepine that inhibits new longterm potentiation but not old long-term potentiation in the hippocampus—before learning
new material, their memory for new material was inhibited. More importantly, inhibiting
the learning of new material retroactively facilitated memory for old material compared
to a saline group (Reder et al., 2007). In a similar design, alcohol retroactively facilitated
prose recall compared to placebo (Moulton et al., 2005). Thus, giving participants a drug
to reduce new long-term potentiation in the hippocampus retroactively facilitates memory,
suggesting that new long-term potentiation can disrupt old long-term potentiation in the
hippocampus.
Third, there is some evidence to support the idea that increasing new long-term
potentiation in the hippocampus retroactively interferes with memory. When rats were
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given a tetanus (electrical stimulation to select neurons) or when rats explored a novel
environment—manipulations that increase new but not old long-term potentiation in the
hippocampus—their memory for hidden platform locations (Morris Water Maze task) or
memory for shock environments (inhibitory avoidance learning) decreased (Brun,
Ytterbo, Morris, Moser, & Moser, 2001; Izquierdo, Schröder, Netto, & Medina, 1999).
Additionally, in the Morris Water Maze task, more frequent tetanuses decreased memory
for hidden platform locations more than less frequent tetanuses (Brun et al., 2001),
consistent with that idea that more new long-term potentiation caused more interference.
Moreover, in the inhibitory avoidance learning task, the novel environment exposure
decreased memory if exposure occurred one hour after learning but not six hours after
learning (Izquierdo et al., 1999), consistent with the idea that new long-term potentiation
disrupts consolidation of older memories. One intuitive implication from these findings is
that if mental effort is new learning that increases new long-term potentiation and if
increasing new long-term potentiation increases retroactive interference, then increasing
mental effort should increase retroactive interference effects. One way to test this is to
increase the degree of learning new material, which should increase retroactive
interference. Indeed, a greater degree of learning new material caused more retroactive
interference compared to a lesser degree of new learning (Archer & Underwood, 1951;
Barnes & Underwood, 1959; Bäuml, 1996; Briggs, 1957), even when other factors that
cause retroactive interference (e.g. retrieval practice and output interference) were
controlled (Delprato, 2005). Thus, one possible explanation for why a greater degree of
learning new material caused more retroactive interference is that better learning
increased mental effort that disrupted consolidation. However, this possibility—that a
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greater degree of mental effort increases retroactive interference—has not been directly
addressed in recent research.
One possible difference between early mental effort theories and Wixted’s (2004b)
mental effort theory is related to new learning: Although Wixted’s (2004b) hypothesis
suggests that mental effort is new learning that increases new long-term potentiation,
early mental effort research suggested that new learning may not be required to cause
retroactive interference. That is, tasks that did not necessarily tax new learning but that
may have increased subjective mental effort caused retroactive interference. For example,
some tasks were naming pictures, reading poetry, and solving logic or math problems.
Thus, subjective mental effort could indicate when retroactive interference occurs. This
view does not describe how mental effort could disrupt consolidation (cf. Müller &
Pilzecker, 1900). Nevertheless, it is possible that these mental effort tasks could have
caused retroactive interference by increasing new long-term potentiation in the
hippocampus (Wixted, 2004b).
Similarity and Response Competition
Early similarity research typically showed that increasing similarity between old
and new material decreased memory (McGeoch & McDonald, 1931; McGeoch, 1942;
Robinson, 1920, 1927; Skaggs, 1925; Wixted, 2004b). For example, increasing the
semantic relatedness between old and new material decreased word recall (McGeoch &
McDonald, 1931). This and other similar findings prompted development of the cueoverload paradigm to test an interference theory of similarity.
The cue overload paradigm tests memory for word pairs. First, participants study
a list of A-B word pairs: A is the stimulus or cue word, and B is the response or target
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word. Then participants study a second list of A-D word pairs (the cue does not change
between lists) or a second list of C-D word pairs (the cue changes between lists). Finally,
participants are shown an ambiguous cue word at test (A) and must provide the target. If
the task tests retroactive interference, memory for first-list targets is tested (B); if the task
tests proactive interference, memory for second-list targets is tested (D). Interference
occurs when participants produce more second-list intrusions (retroactive interference) or
first-list intrusions (proactive interference) after learning an A-D list compared to
learning a C-D list. This is commonly found in RI tasks (Gladis & Braun, 1958; Keppel
& Zavortink, 1969; McGeoch, McKinney, & Peters, 1937; McGeoch, 1942), especially
when the second list is learned just before recall (rather than earlier, e.g. Chandler &
Gargano, 1998). Thus, the ambiguous cue (A) activates two competing responses (B and
D), and this is called response competition: Response competition increases the number
of second-list intrusions because the more recently presented word pairs (A-D) are more
accessible than less recently presented word pairs (A-B).
Response competition theory and its variants are the standard definition of
interference today (J. R. Anderson & Bower, 1980; J. R. Anderson, 1974; M. C.
Anderson et al., 1994; M. C. Anderson, 2003; Bäuml, 1996; Delprato, 2005; Dosher,
1981; Dyne, Humphreys, Bain, & Pike, 1990; Radvansky & Copeland, 2006; Radvansky,
1999, 2005; Tendolkar, Doyle, & Rugg, 1997; Verde, 2004). For example, building on
the cue overload paradigm, the fan effect is the finding that increasing the number of
alternative responses (e.g. A-B, A-C, A-D, A-E) increases retrieval time from memory (J.
R. Anderson, 1974, but see Radvansky & Copeland, 2006b; Radvansky, 1999, 2005). In
situations of response competition, the cue is not uniquely diagnostic of one memory for
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a single target; instead, the cue is common across multiple memories of multiple targets,
decreasing the effectiveness of the cue in retrieving the paired associate (Nairne, 2002).
Thus, one interpretation is that similarity causes interference; that is, memories are
similar to the extent that they share a cue. Consistent with this, when testing memory for
single words, increasing semantic similarity decreased recall (McGeoch & McDonald,
1931), and cue-overload increases the number of second-list intrusions (McGeoch, 1942).
Inconsistent with this, when testing cued recall, increasing synonymy between second-list
and first-list targets (i.e., increasing similarity) increases recall (Gladis & Braun, 1958).
Therefore, a theory of similarity in which increasing similarity ‘always’ causes
interference or ‘always’ causes facilitation can only explain a limited set of findings
(Nairne, 2002; Osgood, 1949; Robinson, 1927; Skaggs, 1925).
Mental Effort and Similarity
Some theories of retroactive interference have accounted for both mental effort
and similarity. For example, as shown in Figure 2, Skaggs (1925) hypothesized that
varying similarity can retroactively facilitate or interfere with recall. The far left x-axis
shows that repeating material can increase memory (Harden, 1929; Robinson, 1927;
Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2012). The middle of the x-axis shows that for different stimuli,
increasing similarity can decrease memory (McGeoch & McDonald, 1931; Robinson,
1920). However, there are exceptions to this: Learning different material, such as in the
cue-overload paradigm (A-B vs. A-D), can increase and decrease memory (e.g.
Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2012) depending on the detection of change between old and new
material, at least in a proactive interference version of the cue-overload task (Jacoby,
Wahlheim, & Yonelinas, 2013; Jacoby & Wahlheim, 2013; Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2012).
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Finally, the far right x-axis shows that dissimilar material can decrease memory because
of mental effort (Müller & Pilzecker, 1900; Skaggs, 1925, 1933).
A more recent model—adapted and shown in Figure 3—treats mental effort and
similarity separately rather than as falling along a single similarity dimension (Dewar et
al., 2007, fig 2). According to the model, mental effort disrupts hippocampal
consolidation, and learning similar stimuli causes response competition (M. C. Anderson,
2003; McGeoch, 1942; Skaggs, 1933). Like Skaggs (1925), this model suggests that
learning new material, regardless of similarity, should cause mental effort (see also,
Wixted, 2004b). Thus, similar and dissimilar material could disrupt hippocampal
consolidation, and similar material, in addition, could cause response competition.
If similar material can disrupt consolidation and induce response competition,
then similarity could enhance retroactive interference due to mental effort. For example,
in a cue-overload paradigm, studying an A-D list could increase second-list intrusions (D)
and disrupt consolidation of A-B items. If consolidation is disrupted, then the A-B
memories memory might not move to long-term storage (e.g., Dudai, 2004) or might
simply become less discriminable from other memories. If so, then similarity could
enhance retroactive interference due to mental effort by increasing A-D accessibility
while reducing discriminability among competing memories. Therefore, mental effort
and similarity could interact to exacerbate retroactive interference effects.
Retroactive Interference in Recognition Memory
Recognition memory is the ability to tell if something was encountered previously.
Recognition memory usually is tested by having participants study a list of items, usually
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words or word pairs. At test, participants are shown old and new items, and participants
decide whether each item is old or new.
Recognition memory decisions are usually described with signal detection theory
(also see Appendix, Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Signal detection theory separates
response criteria from discrimination. Response criteria represents the willingness to
respond a certain way (e.g., willingness to respond “old”), and discrimination is the
ability to tell two categories apart (e.g. old vs. new). In recognition memory, each old and
new item has one memory strength value, and, on average, old items have greater
memory strength values than new items. If these memory strength values were known
and could be plotted, they would form separate “old” and “new” distributions that vary
and overlap. When the old and new memory strength distributions overlap,
discrimination is worse compared to when these distributions are relatively nonoverlapping. In addition, a response criterion separates both distributions into “old” and
“new” decisions: If a memory strength value exceeds the criterion, the item is called
“old”; otherwise, the item is called “new”. Correct “old” decisions are called hits, and
incorrect “old” decisions are called false alarms. Hits and false alarms can be used to
calculate discrimination and response criteria (see Appendix for more details).
Recognition memory performance can be explained by two retrieval processes,
familiarity and recollection (Atkinson & Juola, 1974; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby,
1991; Mandler, 1980; Parks & Yonelinas, 2007; Wixted, 2007; Yonelinas & Jacoby,
1994; Yonelinas, 2002). Familiarity is the feeling that something occurred, without
recollecting when or where it occurred, and recollection is the retrieval of episodic details
associated with a prior event. For example, upon seeing a news story, one might feel that
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the story is familiar without remembering where or when it occurred. This is familiarity.
Upon further thought, one might remember that they read that same story online a day
earlier. This is recollection. Thus, on the basis of either familiarity or recollection, one
would conclude that one read that news story before.
The dual-process signal-detection model suggests that familiarity occurs to some
degree for each item but that recollection occurs for some items but not others (Yonelinas,
1994). Successful recollection leads to high-confidence responses: If a participant
recollects episodic details, then they can be confident the item was studied. When
recollection is unsuccessful, participants may vary in their confidence because decisions
rely on familiarity. The dual-process signal-detection model can be used to estimate the
relative contributions of recollection and familiarity to recognition memory performance
(see Appendix; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007; Yonelinas, 1994).
The associative recognition task is driven primarily by recollection (Yonelinas,
1997). In this task, participants study a list of word pairs (i.e., A-B, C-D: daisy-carnival,
wound-teeth), and at test, participants discriminate between intact (i.e., A-B, C-D: daisycarnival, wound-teeth) and rearranged (i.e., A-D, C-B: daisy-teeth, wound-carnival) word
pairs. On average, each word pair should be equally familiar because they consist of
studied items, so familiarity should be relatively non-diagnostic of the pairing. Task
performance, therefore, should rely more heavily on recollection of specific word
pairings than familiarity. Successful recollection would lead to high-confidence hits for
intact word pairs (i.e., correct “intact” decisions) and correct rejections for rearranged
word pairs (i.e., correct “rearranged” decisions, also called recollect-reject; Rotello &
Heit, 2000; Rotello, Macmillan, & Van Tassel, 2000; Yonelinas, 1997). When
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recollection fails, decisions would rely on familiarity, which would lead to hits and to
false alarms (i.e., incorrect “intact” decisions) at all levels of confidence.
Recollection and familiarity are considered independent processes mediated by
different brain regions. Indeed, damage to the hippocampus preferentially impairs
associative recognition memory (an indicator of recollection) over familiarity (Yonelinas,
Kroll, Dobbins, Lazzara, & Knight, 1998), and damage to the perirhinal cortex
preferentially impairs familiarity over recollection (Bowles et al., 2007, 2010; Yonelinas,
2002). Thus, the evidence suggests that the hippocampus is necessary for recollection,
and the perirhinal cortex is necessary for familiarity. Research generally supports this
double dissociation, both behaviorally and neurologically (for reviews see Parks &
Yonelinas, 2007; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007; Yonelinas, 2002; but also see Wixted, 2007).
As the neurological double dissociation suggests, the hippocampus preferentially
drives recollection-driven memory, such as associative memory, whereas the perirhinal
cortex preferentially drives familiarity-driven memory, such as item memory (Yonelinas,
2002). Therefore, factors that affect hippocampal consolidation should affect recollection
rather than familiarity. Consistent with this hypothesis, one rat study found that blocking
hippocampal consolidation decreased associative memory but not item memory (Balderas
et al., 2008). By contrast blocking perirhinal cortical consolidation decreased item
memory but not associative memory. This double dissociation suggests that brain regionspecific consolidation is necessary for brain region-specific memory. Therefore, mental
effort that disrupts consolidation in the hippocampus should primarily affect
hippocampally-driven memory or memory processes, like recollection. There are two
lines of evidence to support this relationship.
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First, there is some evidence to suggest that decreasing new long-term
potentiation in the hippocampus retroactively facilitates hippocampal-driven memory, but
this does not occur for non-hippocampal memory (e.g. item memory). One way to
decrease new long-term potentiation in the hippocampus is by manipulating sleep, though
this might depend on different sleep stages: Slow-wave sleep may prioritize old longterm potentiation over new long-term potentiation in the hippocampus, whereas REM
sleep may prioritize new long-term potentiation over old long-term potentiation in the
hippocampus (Mednick, Cai, Shuman, Anagnostaras, & Wixted, 2011). Thus, slow-wave
sleep rather than REM sleep could selectively enhance hippocampally-driven memory.
Indeed, sleep selectively benefits recollection-driven and hippocampus-driven memory in
humans and rats (Inostroza, Binder, & Born, 2013; van der Helm, Gujar, Nishida, &
Walker, 2011). This hypothesis is directly supported with recollection and familiarity
estimates derived from introspective judgments: Compared to REM sleep or remaining
awake, slow-wave sleep increased recollection estimates but not familiarity estimates
(Daurat, Terrier, Foret, & Tiberge, 2007). These data are consistent with the hypothesis
that sleep selectively enhances consolidation necessary for hippocampally-driven
memory and memory processes.
Second, there is some evidence to suggest that consolidation in the hippocampus
is temporally graded and is selectively important for hippocampally-driven memory, such
as memory for locations or contexts (Yonelinas, 2002). In support of this hypothesis,
blocking consolidation in the hippocampus made rats less likely to notice objects
displaced from their original locations but did not affect object recognition memory
(Oliveira, Hawk, Abel, & Havekes, 2010). This effect only occurred if consolidation was
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blocked soon after study compared to a later delay. Thus, hippocampal consolidation may
be temporally graded. Therefore, if, as Wixted (2004b) suggests, mental effort associated
with new learning increases new long-term potentiation in the hippocampus, then mental
effort should selectively affect memory processes thought to depend on the hippocampus.
Moreover, as earlier evidence suggested, increasing mental effort might also increase
new long-term potentiation. If so, then increased mental effort should affect recollection
rather than familiarity. This hypothesis was explored in the current study.
Response competition and similarity effects in recognition memory are mixed.
When testing item memory for full-page advertisements, learning similar new
advertisements did not affect recognition memory (Heine, 1914, as cited in McKinney,
1935). Also, although cue-overload typically reduces recall, when cue overload was
manipulated in associative recognition memory, cue overload decreased hits, decreased
false alarms, or did not affect hits and false alarms (Dyne et al., 1990). To explain these
mixed results, Verde (2004) proposed that cue overload manipulations affect recollection
and familiarity differently and that the pattern of results depend on recollection and
familiarity contributions to performance. Thus, cue overload should make recollection
less diagnostic of pairings because recollection of an associate would not necessarily
produce the correct answer. This should decrease recollection-driven hits. Cue overload
also increases the number of items in memory, so this should increase the number of
matches between a probe and old memories. Given that familiarity is likely determined,
in part, by this type of global matching mechanism (e.g. Ratcliff & McKoon, 2000), this
should increase the number of hits and false alarms due to familiarity. This pattern of
results is what Verde (2004) found in a fan effect study: Increasing the number of
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associates decreased recollection hits but increased familiarity hits and false alarms.
These data suggest that response competition should reduce recollection but that it might
affect familiarity-related response criteria or discrimination (i.e., changes in hits and false
alarms could signal changes in response criteria or discrimination). For the same reasons,
increasing the similarity of the alternative responses (i.e., second-list targets) could
reduce recollection and may or may not affect familiarity.
Overall, the literature review suggests that there are two sources of retroactive
interference, mental effort and similarity. Wixted (2004b) hypothesized that mental effort
associated with new learning increases new long-term potentiation in the hippocampus,
disrupting consolidation of old memories (old long-term potentiation). By contrast,
depending on the degree of similarity, similarity should promote response competition
and thus interference. Therefore, mental effort should selectively disrupt recognition
memory processes thought to depend on the hippocampus (recollection, not familiarity),
whereas similarity should affect recollection and familiarity in different ways. Research,
so far, has focused on free recall and cued-recall tasks with few studies investigating
mental effort in recognition memory and no studies considering mental effort and
similarity within the same experiment. Mental effort and similarity should affect recall
and recognition memory similarly, at least to the extent that they rely on similar recalllike processes (Dyne et al., 1990; Okada, Vilberg, & Rugg, 2012; Yonelinas, 2002)
The Current Study
The current study asked whether mental effort and similarity cause retroactive
interference in associative recognition memory. Experiment 1 asked whether the degree
of mental effort affects recollection and familiarity estimates differently at different TPIs.
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Experiment 2 asked whether the degree of mental effort affects recollection and
familiarity estimates differently for higher versus lower similarity.
Experiment 1 asked if mental effort affects recollection. Like past research testing
main effects of mental effort (mental effort vs. rest) and main effects of TPI (Lechner et
al., 1999; Müller & Pilzecker, 1900; Skaggs, 1925; Wixted, 2004b), Experiment 1
compared associative recognition memory performance after rest and after mental effort
presented at different TPIs. The current experiments extended this by inducing different
degrees of mental effort at different TPIs (e.g. Archer & Underwood, 1951, as cited in
Wixted, 2004b). This design addressed several shortcomings of previous experiments. In
the past, rest periods were filled (e.g. reading); compared to mental effort, rehearsal may
have been more likely during rest; and different tasks could have induced different
degrees of mental effort. In the current experiment, participants rested in silence with the
experimenter present; potential differences in rehearsal were reduced by manipulating
degree of mental effort; and only one mental effort task was used (math problems). As a
manipulation check for rehearsal, participants rated the frequency of spontaneous
remindings; as a manipulation check for degree of mental effort, participants rated their
subjective experience of mental effort.
Experiment 2 asked whether mental effort and similarity affect recollection and
familiarity estimates. The mental effort predictions were the same as in Experiment 1.
For similarity, past research showed that cue overload (fan effect) reduced recollection
hits and increased familiarity hits and false alarms (Verde 2004). Recollection was
reduced because recollection of a response would not necessarily lead to the correct
answer. Thus, if the similarity among competing responses is increased, as in Experiment
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2, then recollection estimates should decrease. For familiarity, increases in hits and false
alarms could indicate a change in response criteria or in discrimination. Therefore, it is
unclear if and how similarity would affect familiarity estimates. Finally, an interaction
might be expected if learning the A-D list increases both mental effort and similarity
effects.
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CHAPTER 2
EXPERIMENT 1
The goal of Experiment 1 was to examine whether mental effort and the temporal
point of interpolation (TPI) interact to affect recollection and familiarity estimates in an
associative recognition task. As Figure 3 shows, participants were randomly assigned to
be in a control group, or they were randomly assigned to groups engaged in a low or high
mental effort task presented 0-, 10-, or 20-minutes after study. Mental effort was
manipulated by requiring participants to mentally solve either easy addition problems
(e.g., 2 + 2 = ?) or difficult subtraction problems (e.g., 83 – 9 = ?). Solving easy math
problems should require less mental effort than solving difficult math problems.
Moreover, math problems are highly dissimilar from word pairs, which should minimize
response competition effects.
It was hypothesized that solving difficult rather than easy math problems would
decrease recollection estimates. Similarly, solving either problem type at earlier rather
than later TPIs should decrease recollection estimates. Finally, mental effort and TPI
should interact such that more mental effort decreases recollection estimates more at
earlier rather than later TPIs. This interaction would support the hypothesis that mental
effort causes retroactive interference by disrupting consolidation. Also, recollection
estimates should be smaller after any experimental condition than after the control
condition, which would replicate early mental effort research. Because evidence suggests
that familiarity does not depend on the hippocampus and because there is no evidence
that new long-term potentiation in the hippocampus disrupts non-hippocampal memory,
mental effort and TPI should not affect familiarity estimates, but only to the extent that
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mental effort selectively disrupts hippocampally-driven memory.
Method
Participants
Participants (N = 140, Male = 52) with ages ranging from 18 to 56 years old (M =
20.92 years, SD = 5.45 years) were recruited from university courses and were randomly
assigned to test conditions (n = 20 per condition). They were tested individually with the
experimenter present and given course credit for participation.
Participants were screened based on their responses to a pre-experimental
questionnaire: medical conditions (e.g., memory-related neurological disorders),
medications taken (e.g., benzodiazepines), loss of consciousness for more than five
minutes, and length of time speaking English (e.g., must be native English speaker or
speaking English longer than 20 years). All participants met criteria. However, some
participants were excluded due to experimenter error (n = 6) and later re-run to equate
group sizes.
Materials
Word stimuli. Two lists of 240 nouns with middle Kucera-Francis word
frequency values (e.g., 50-150), four to eight letters in length, were randomly selected
from the MRC Psycholinguistic database (Kucera & Francis, 1967). Each list was
matched for word frequency, and within each list, words were randomly paired and then
scanned for preexisting semantic or orthographic relatedness that might give the word
pair a mnemonic advantage or disadvantage over other word pairs (e.g., chair-table or
chair-fair). Each word pair served as intact or rearranged word pairs across conditions,
and each word served as a cue or target word across conditions.
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Math stimuli. Addition problems and subtraction problems (n = 35; randomly
selected from larger pool, N = 1943) were recorded into 2.0 s audio files by a female
research assistant. Analyzed math accuracy scores were the proportion of correctly
answered math problems.
Abbreviated Math Anxiety Scale. To control for individual differences in math
anxiety, participants responded to the Abbreviated Math Anxiety Scale about how
anxious they would feel in scenarios involving math (Hopko, Mahadevan, Bare, & Hunt,
2003). Analyzed Abbreviate Math Anxiety Scale scores were individual averages across
all ratings for each scenario.
Post-experimental questionnaire. A questionnaire given after the final test
assessed subjective mental effort, rehearsal frequency, and sleep intensity during the
retention interval. Participants rated how much mental effort they experienced during the
break (How mentally demanding was the break?) using a scale numbered from 1
(minimum mental effort) to 7 (maximum mental effort); participants rated how frequently
studied materials came to mind during the break (How frequently did the words you
studied come to mind during the break?) using a scale numbered from 1 (not frequently)
to 7 (very frequently); and participants rated how intense their sleep was (Please rate the
intensity of your sleep during the break.) on a scale numbered from 1 (did not sleep at all)
to 7 (slept for most or all of the break).
Procedure
After filling out informed consent forms and pre-experimental questionnaires,
participants were tested individually on computers running E-Prime 1.2 (Schneider,
Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). Sound was delivered through the monitor’s built-in
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speakers.
As shown in Figure 3, under incidental learning instructions, participants studied
120 word pairs (daisy-carnival, wound-teeth), and each word pair was presented one at a
time in the middle of the screen for 3.5 s with a .5 s ISI. The order of word pairs was
randomized for each participant. While the word pair was on the screen, participants
rated how pleasant each word was together using on-screen response options 1 (pleasant)
and 3 (not pleasant). Regardless of whether participants responded within 3.5 s, the
computer automatically advanced to the next word pair after 3.5 s. This study section
lasted eight minutes.
During the 30-minute retention interval, participants were given different
instructions depending on their randomly assigned condition. Participants in the control
condition were told to relax and get as comfortable as they could. They could not talk to
the experimenter, play on their phones, or surf the internet; they sat quietly with their
eyes open. Participants in the interference conditions mentally solved math problems
presented over headphones, responded using the keyboard, and received immediate
feedback about their accuracy. The order of math problems was randomized for each
participant. Once a participant heard a math problem (2.0 s), a response box appeared on
the screen for up to 10.2 s. If the participant responded before 10.2 s, then the screen
cleared and the correct answer appeared on screen for 1.5 s. After the correct answer
appeared, participants saw a fixation cross that cleared after the remainder of the total
trial time (12.2 s). If they did not respond after 10.2 s, participants saw the correct answer
with the message, “Please respond more quickly”. Participants in the low mental effort
condition solved easy addition problems, and participants in the high mental effort
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condition solved difficult subtraction problems. Although an 85% accuracy cut-off was
initially intended to exclude participants who put forth too little or too much effort, all
participants were included despite having math accuracy scores less than 85%. This is
because the math problems chosen were more difficult than anticipated (see Table 1).
Participants solved math problems for eight minutes.
Participants also solved easy or difficult math problems at different TPIs.
Participants in the 0-minute condition solved addition or subtraction problems
immediately after study and then rested for the remaining 20 minutes. Participants in the
10-minute (or 20-minute) condition first rested for 10 minutes (or 20 minutes), and then
solved addition or subtraction problems. Then participants rested for the remaining 12
minutes (or 2 minutes). A sound signaled math problem onset for the 10- and 20-minute
conditions, and the same sound signaled test onset after the final break. Instructions for
each break period and math problem period were given before participants began each
break or solved math problems. The entire retention interval was 30 minutes.
During the associative recognition test, participants rated their confidence in their
decisions about whether word pairs were intact or rearranged. Intact word pairs were
word pairs that were the same at test as they were at study (daisy-carnival, wound-teeth),
and rearranged word pairs were recombined from original word pairs (daisy-teeth,
wound-carnival). Each word pair appeared one at a time in the middle of the screen,
randomized for each participant, with the confidence scale displayed on-screen
throughout the test. Ratings 4-6 corresponded to word pairs participants thought were
intact, and ratings 1-3 corresponded to word pairs participants thought were rearranged.
Six meant that participants were absolutely sure the word pair was intact, 5 meant less
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sure, and 4 meant guessing. It was the same for the other ratings: 1 meant that
participants were absolutely sure the word pair was rearranged, 2 meant less sure, and 3
meant guessing. Testing was self-paced, and participants were encouraged to spread their
responses out across the scale so that over the course of the testing session, all responses
were used. After the test, participants filled out the post-experimental questionnaire, were
debriefed, and then given course credit.
Results
Experiment 1 examined whether mental effort and the TPI interacted to affect
recollection and familiarity estimates in an associative recognition test. All signaldetection and model estimation procedures are briefly outlined in the Appendix. The
dependent measures examined were da (discrimination between intact and rearranged
word pairs), recollection estimates, recollect-reject estimates, familiarity estimates, and
post-experimental questionnaire scores. As a reminder of the predictions, increased math
problem difficulty (mental effort) should decrease recollection estimates more at earlier
(0-minute) than later (10- or 20-minute) TPIs. If mental effort does not affect
consolidation outside of the hippocampus (Balderas et al., 2008; Wixted, 2004b) and if
familiarity depends on the perirhinal cortex rather than the hippocampus (Parks &
Yonelinas, 2007; Yonelinas, 2002), then mental effort should not affect familiarity (d’) .
Data screening and analysis
Within each condition, data were screened for univariate outliers (|z-scores| > 3.29,
p < .001) and normality assumptions (Shapiro-Wilks test p < .05, visual inspection of
histograms, and |skewness| and |kurtosis| values > 1). Most data did not meet normality
assumptions, so non-parametric analyses are reported for all statistics, unless otherwise
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noted. In most cases, no differences in the patterns of results emerged for parametric and
non-parametric tests. Differences are footnoted. Alpha was set to .05 for all analyses
unless otherwise noted. Marginal significance was considered if a p-value was
between .05 and .10.
If the data met parametric assumptions, the main effect of mental effort—
including the control condition—was assessed using a one-way ANOVA. The main
effect of TPI and the mental effort by TPI interaction were assessed as part of a 2 x 3
ANOVA. In addition, planned t-tests were conducted on marginal means to assess the
mental effort and TPI main effects. Also, planned t-tests were conducted on means in the
mental effort by TPI conditions to assess the interaction.
If the data did not meet parametric assumptions, the main effects of mental effort
(including the control condition) and TPI (excluding the control condition) were assessed
using the Kruskall-Wallis test. In addition, planned comparisons using Mann Whitney Utests were conducted on marginal means to assess main effects. The non-parametric
interaction was assessed using the adjusted rank transformation test, which analyzes
individual interaction scores predicted by the general linear model (Leys & Schumann,
2010). Each observed score is a linear combination of the grand mean (μ …), factor effects,
interactions, and sampling error. Given that the grand mean is constant and sampling
error varies around 0, Leys and Schumann (2010) suggested that only the marginal factor
means need to be removed to reveal the interaction scores (see also Rosnow & Rosenthal,
1995). To do this, each row and column marginal mean was subtracted from each
individual score. Technically, the remaining score includes the grand mean (baseline), the
predicted interaction score, and sampling error. Then, like other non-parametric
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techniques, the remaining individual scores are rank averaged disregarding condition.
Finally, an ANOVA is performed on the averages of the predicted interaction rankings.
Only the interaction term is interpreted. In addition to this analysis, planned t-tests were
conducted on the interaction rankings from the mental effort by TPI conditions to assess
the non-parametric interaction. Reported effect size for non-parametric main effects are
based on χ2, called Cramer’s V, which can be considered as the proportion of maximum
possible variation accounted for by a factor.
In the non-parametric interaction analyses, the marginal mean from the control
condition was not subtracted from each individual score and was not included in rankings.
This is because the primary interest of the interaction was between mental effort and TPI,
disregarding the control condition. This resulted in a 2 x 3 between-subjects ANOVA
where only the interaction term was interpreted (see previous paragraph). Disregarding
the control condition, however, limited direct comparisons between rankings in these
conditions and raw control condition scores.
Another set of planned comparisons used t-tests (parametric) or Mann Whitney
U-tests (non-parametric) to assess differences between the control condition and each of
the other conditions. This analysis was conducted as a replication of early mental effort
research comparing memory after rest and after a mental effort task.
A final set of planned comparisons used t-tests to compare each group score to the
lowest value possible. For example, for scale items, the lowest score was a ‘1’. For
primary measures, this score was often ‘0’. This analysis was conducted to assess
whether the mean scores in each condition were greater than the lowest value.
Descriptive and inferential statistics are presented in two Tables: Table 1 contains
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post-experimental questionnaire measures, and Table 2 contains the primary measures.
Although mostly non-parametric tests were conducted, means and standard deviations are
presented in the tables to facilitate understanding of the patterns in the data. In addition,
the results of each statistical test is presented in these tables, including the main effects,
interactions, and planned comparisons. For significant (p < .05) and marginally
significant effects (.05 < p < .10), results and average non-parametric rankings (or means,
if applicable) are presented in the main text. Otherwise, the main text presents only highlevel summaries of the results.
Counterbalances
To determine that counterbalancing did not affect any outcome, a series of 2 x 2
between-subjects parametric ANOVAs were conducted for each dependent variable. No
statistically significant counterbalance effects emerged, although some marginally
significant effects did occur (all ps > .05). These analyses are not reported further.
Post-experimental questionnaire data and math measures
Presented next are results for post-experimental ratings of subjective mental effort,
rehearsal, and sleep intensity. Also included are analyses for Abbreviated Math Anxiety
Scale scores and math accuracy. Significance and effect sizes of omnibus tests along with
means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1.
How mentally demanding was the break? As Table 1 shows, the main effect of
mental effort was significant, χ2(2) = 34.125, p < .0001, Cramer’s V = .349. Planned
Mann Whitney U-tests on marginal means revealed that participants experienced less
mental effort between the easy and difficult conditions, MEasy = 41.83 and MDifficult =
79.17, p < .0001; and marginally less in the easy than in the unfilled conditions, MEasy =
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37.91 and MUnfilled = 48.28, p = .064. There were no differences in mean non-parametric
rankings between the difficult and unfilled conditions. The main effect of TPI and the
interaction were not significant.
Planned Mann Whitney U-tests comparing each condition to the control condition
revealed that participants experienced more mental effort in the unfilled condition than in
the Easy-10-minute condition (non-parametric rankings: MUnfilled = 23.95 > MEasy, 10 Minutes
= 17.05, p = .043). This comparison was marginal for the Easy-20-minute condition (nonparametric rankings: MUnfilled = 23.63 and MEasy, 20 Minutes = 17.18, p = .054). Planned ttests comparing each group to the lowest scale value revealed that each group
experienced more mental effort than 1 (ts(19) > 2.666, ps < .015), suggesting that
participants reported some level of mental effort relative to none at all. Overall, the
mental effort manipulation changed subjective mental effort ratings, although not always
in the manner predicted.
How frequently did the words you studied come to mind during the break?
As Table 1 shows, the main effects of mental effort, of TPI, and the interaction were not
significant, suggesting that participants rated their degree of rehearsal similarly across
conditions. Planned Mann Whitney U-tests comparing each condition to the control
condition confirmed these findings. Planned t-tests comparing each group to the lowest
scale value revealed that participants indicated that studied words frequently came to
mind during the break (ts(19) > 2.666, ps < .015).
Please rate the intensity of your sleep during the break. As Table 1 shows, the
main effect of mental effort, of TPI, and the interaction were not significant, suggesting
that participants rated their sleep intensity similarly across conditions. Planned Mann
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Whitney U-tests comparing each condition to the control condition confirmed these
findings. Planned t-tests comparing each group to the lowest scale value revealed that
participants indicated that sleep intensity was greater than 1 (ts(19) > 2.643, ps < .016),
suggesting that participants’ sleep intensity was greater than no sleep.
Average Abbreviated Math Anxiety Scale scores. As Table 1 shows, the main
effect of mental effort, of TPI, and the interaction were not significant, suggesting that
participants had similar Abbreviated Math Anxiety Scale scores across conditions. Thus,
math anxiety did not confound any effect on the primary measures. Planned Mann
Whitney U-tests comparing each condition to the control condition confirmed these
findings. Planned t-tests compared each group to the lowest scale value, and this analysis
revealed that participants had Abbreviated Math Anxiety Scale scores greater than 1
(ts(19) > 3.199, ps < .005), suggesting that participants in each group had at least some
math anxiety relative to none at all.
Math Accuracy. As Table 1 shows, a 2 x 3 parametric ANOVA (no control
condition) revealed a significant main effect of mental effort, F(1, 114) = 157.616, p
< .0001, ηp2 = .580, with larger math accuracy scores in the easy condition (M = 99.4%)
than in the difficult condition (M = 69.23%), suggesting that participants did better on the
easy than difficult math problems. The main effect of the TPI and the interaction were not
significant. These results confirm that participants performed more poorly on the difficult
than on the easy math problems.
Signal-detection and model estimates
Presented next are the signal-detection measures and model estimates, and the
model is described in more detail in the Error! Reference source not found..
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Significance and effect sizes of omnibus tests along with means and standard deviations
are presented in Table 2.
da. As Table 2 shows, the main effect of mental effort, of TPI, and the interaction
were not significant, suggesting that participants discriminated intact from rearranged
word pairs to a similar degree across conditions. Planned Mann Whitney U-tests
comparing each condition to the control condition confirmed these findings. Planned ttests comparing each group to the lowest theoretical value revealed that participants had
da scores greater than 0 (ts(19) > 7.910, ps < .0001), suggesting that participants
discriminated intact from rearranged word pairs in each group more than what would be
expected by chance.
Dual-process signal-detection model fit. As indicated in the Appendix,
recollection, recollect-reject, and familiarity estimates were derived using the dualprocess signal-detection model (Yonelinas, 1994). Before conducting statistical analyses
on process estimates, it was important to determine how well the model fit individual
subjects’ confidence response data. Model fit indices were calculated based on χ 2 with 2
df. If an estimated χ2 was less than the critical χ 2 value (3.84), then the model fit
individual subject data adequately (p > .05).
Within each condition, the percentage of participants for which the dual-process
signal-detection model did not fit the data (p < .05) was calculated. This descriptive
analysis revealed that the model fit the data for most participants across conditions. The
largest number of participants for which the model did not fit was four participants in the
Difficult-20 minute condition (80% had good model fit). The smallest number of
participants was one participant in the unfilled condition and the Difficult-0 minute
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condition (95% had good model fit). Although the estimates for these participants may
not have been estimated properly, it was still decided to retain these participants for
analysis given that the goal was to generalize any effects to the population. Nevertheless,
inclusion and exclusion of these participants did not change the pattern of results, so
statistics with all participants included are reported.
Recollection. As shown in Table 2, the main effect of mental effort was not
significant, but the main effect of TPI was significant, χ2(2) = 7.94, p = .019, Cramer’s V
= .168. As Figure 5 shows, planned Mann Whitney U-tests on marginal means revealed
larger recollection estimates after 20 minutes compared to 0- or 10-minutes (U-tests: M0
Minutes

= 40.93 = M10 Minutes = 40.08, p = .870; M0 Minutes = 33.88 < M20 Minutes = 47.13, p

= .011; M10 Minutes = 34.48 < M20 Minutes = 46.53, p = .020). The interaction was not
significant. Planned Mann Whitney U-tests testing the interaction revealed partial support
for the TPI main effect (U-tests: MEasy, 0 Minutes = 16.73 < MEasy, 20 Minutes = 24.28, p = .041;
MEasy, 10 Minutes = 17.15 < MEasy, 20 Minutes = 23.85, p = .070). Planned Mann Whitney U-tests
comparing each condition to the control condition were not significant. Planned t-tests
comparing each group to 0 revealed that all recollection estimates were greater than 0
(ts(19) > 6.216, ps < .0001), suggesting that recollection did occur at least to some degree
within each condition.
Recollect-reject. As Table 2 and Figure 6 show, the main effect of mental effort
was marginally significant, χ2(2) = 5.542, p = .063, Cramer’s V = .141. Planned Mann
Whitney U-tests assessing the mental effort marginal means revealed that recollect-reject
estimates were smaller after some mental effort than after rest: MUnfilled = 49.65 > MEasy =
37.45, p = .023; MUnfilled = 48.70 > MDifficult = 37.77, p = .044. The main effect of TPI was
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not significant. Planned Mann-Whitney U-tests assessing the TPI marginal means
revealed a marginally significant difference between the 10-minute and 20-minute
conditions, M10 Mins = 44.75 > M20 Mins = 36.25, p = .057.
The non-parametric interaction was significant, F(2, 114) = 5.60, p = .005, ηp2
= .09. Planned t-tests on interaction rankings suggested that mental effort mattered for the
0-minute and 10-minute conditions, but the direction was opposite of what was predicted
for the 10-minute condition (interaction rankings: MEasy, 0 Mins = 71.50, MDifficult, 0 Mins =
48.00, MEasy, 10 Mins = 37.05, MDifficult, 10 Mins = 58.35, MEasy, 20 Mins = 82.50, and MDifficult, 20
Mins

= 66.05; results: MEasy, 0 Mins > MDifficult, 0 Mins, p = .024; MEasy, 10 Mins < MDifficult, 10 Mins, p

= .037; MEasy, 20 Mins = MDifficult, 20 Mins, p = .106). Additionally, recollect-reject estimates
were smallest in the 10-minute condition compared to the other TPI conditions for easy
math problems (interaction rankings: see above; results: MEasy, 10 Mins < MEasy, 0 Mins, p
= .003; MEasy, 10 Minutes < MEasy, 20 Mins, p < .0001). There were no differences among TPI
conditions for difficult math problems1.
Planned Mann Whitney U-tests comparing each condition to the control condition
were significant for the following conditions: Easy-10 Minute (MUnfilled = 24.70 > MEasy, 10
Mins

= 16.30, p = .013); Difficult-0 Minute (MUnfilled = 24.25 > M0 Minutes = 16.75, p = .024);

Difficult-20 Minute (MUnfilled = 25.05 > M20 Minutes = 15.95, p = .006); and marginally
significant for Easy-20 Minute (MUnfilled = 23.60 > MEasy, 20 Mins = 17.40, p = .062). In each
case, recollect-reject estimates were larger in the control condition than in the other
1

The parametric tests revealed a different pattern of results for the interaction. This different pattern of
results likely occurred because of low marginal mean values that potentially reversed the pattern. The
interaction was significant, F(2, 114) = 5.463, p = .005, ηp2 = .087. Uncorrected follow-up t-tests revealed
that, for the 10-minute condition, recollect-reject estimates were larger in the Difficult (M = .135) than Easy
(M = .033) conditions, p = .005. In addition, for the Difficult condition, recollect-reject estimates were
larger in the 10-minute condition (M = .135) than in the 0-minute condition (M = .050, p = .018) and in the
20-minute condition (M = .025, p = .022).
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conditions, suggesting that solving easy or difficult math problems at various delays
decreased recollect-reject estimates. Planned t-tests compared each group to 0 and
revealed that recollect-reject estimates were greater than 0 (ts(19) > 2.108, ps < .049),
except for the recollect-reject estimates in the Difficult-20 Minutes condition (t(19) =
2.044, p = .055). These comparisons suggest that participants in most groups relied on
recollect-reject to some extent in the associative recognition task.
Familiarity. As Table 2 shows, the main effect of mental effort, of TPI, and the
interaction were not significant, suggesting that familiarity estimates were similar across
conditions (see also Figure 7). Planned Mann Whitney U-tests comparing each condition
to the control condition confirmed these findings. Planned t-tests comparing each group
to 0 revealed that all familiarity estimates were greater than 0 (ts(19) > 4.549, ps < .0001),
suggesting that all groups discriminated intact from rearranged items on the basis of
familiarity more than what would be expected by chance.
Discussion
Experiment 1 tested whether the degree of mental effort at different TPIs affected
recollection and familiarity estimates in an associative recognition task. Experiment 1
showed a medium-sized main effect of TPI, such that solving math problems 0 or 10
minutes after study decreased recollection estimates relative to 20 minutes. This TPI
effect was specific to recollection estimates: TPI did not affect familiarity estimates. In
addition, mental effort and the mental effort by TPI interaction were not significant.
These data are most consistent with the hypothesis that mental effort presented earlier
rather than later after study disrupted consolidation necessary for recollection.
Mental effort and TPI inconsistently affected recollection and recollect-reject
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estimates. First, mental effort decreased recollect-reject but not recollection estimates
relative to the control condition. Second, TPI affected recollection but not recollect-reject
estimates. Third, the interaction showed that recollect-reject estimates increased,
decreased, or did not change with mental effort depending on the TPI condition. If
recollection and recollect-reject depend on the hippocampus, mental effort and TPI
should have affected them similarly. In addition, the facilitating mental effort effects are
not predicted by any theory.
One reason for the inconsistent and null mental effort effects may be that mental
effort was not manipulated appropriately. The current experiments assumed that
increasing the mental demand of nonspecific tasks would cause retroactive interference,
but this prediction was not consistently supported. Thus, these results join past research
finding inconsistent mental effort effects: In some cases, mental effort decreased recall
relative to rest (Baldwin & Shaw, 1895; Calkins, 1896; DeCamp, 1915; Lechner et al.,
1999; Lewy, 1895; Müller & Pilzecker, 1900; Münsterberg & Campbell, 1894; Skaggs,
1925; Warren & Shaw, 1895), but, in other cases, mental effort did not affect recall in
healthy controls (Dewar et al., 2010). Thus, the current results do not support the
hypothesis that subjective mental effort, in and of itself, causes RI.
Additional lack of support for the subjective mental effort hypothesis comes from
the finding that performance did not change consistently with subjective mental effort
ratings. Consistent with predictions, participants reported more subjective mental effort
after solving difficult rather than easy math problems. Inconsistent with predictions,
participants reported less subjective mental effort in the control condition and high
mental effort condition compared to the low mental effort condition, regardless of TPI.
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This latter result could have occurred because the question probed different information
between the mental effort and control conditions. Perhaps control participants rated the
content of their thoughts for mental effort, whereas participants in the math problem
conditions rated the mental demand caused by solving the math problems. Thus,
participants may have had different reference points for the scale (i.e., referencing
different information and then basing their decisions on that referenced information).
Another possible reason for the inconsistent mental effort effects is that current
and past experiments did not account for long-term potentiation in the hippocampus:
Some manipulations of mental effort may increase or decrease new long-term
potentiation in the hippocampus to different extents (e.g. novel environment exposure,
Wixted, 2004b), which could cause different amounts of retroactive interference. If so,
then the current results suggest that subjective mental effort and new long-term
potentiation in the hippocampus are independent—at least in the current experiments.
This independence would make it difficult to find behavioral manipulations that affect
new long-term potentiation in the hippocampus.
Recollection estimates were similar in the high mental effort condition and the
control condition, but they were smaller in the control condition than in the 20-minute
condition. These results are problematic because they suggest that the control condition
did not control mental effort. One reason for the lack of control is that participants could
have been pre-occupied with their thoughts, and these thoughts could have been
‘mentally effortful’. Often, participants indicated they thought about what they were
going to do after the experiment or about an upcoming test. However, it is unclear why
30 minutes of this would somehow be worse for recollection than 22 minutes of planning
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and eight minutes of solving easy or difficult math problems. Overall, while the TPI
effect is consistent with a consolidation hypothesis, the other mental effort effects are
difficult to interpret.
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CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENT 2
The goal of Experiment 2 was to examine how mental effort and similarity affect
recollection and familiarity estimates in a cue-overload version of the associative
recognition task. As Figure 8 shows, participants were randomly assigned to be in a low
or high mental effort group. Mental effort was manipulated between-subjects by having
participants solve easy or difficult anagrams of second-list targets in between study and
test. Similarity was manipulated within-subjects by having participants learn a second list
of word pairs where the targets were similar (synonyms) or dissimilar (random) to firstlist targets (e.g., study: A-B; interference: A-B’ or A-D).
If increased mental effort increases retroactive interference, then participants who
solve difficult anagrams should have smaller recollection estimates than participants who
solve easy anagrams. If similarity increases response competition, then studying similar
word pairs should increase competition between responses (Gibson, 1940; McGeoch,
1942). Past research found that increasing the number of associated responses in the cueoverload paradigm decreased recollection hits and increased familiarity hits and false
alarms (Verde, 2004). Thus, mental effort and similarity were expected to reduce
recollection estimates. Like Experiment, mental effort should not affect familiarity
estimates because familiarity does not seem to depend on the hippocampus (Eichenbaum,
Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007). In contrast to mental effort, similarity could affect
familiarity in two ways: It might affect familiarity estimates, a measure of discrimination,
or it might affect response criteria (Verde, 2004). To measure familiarity in the current
experiments, however, familiarity was estimated across different response criteria (see
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Appendix). It is currently unknown if mental effort and similarity interact to affect
memory performance. However, any observed interaction would help understanding of
the roles of mental effort and similarity in RI (see General Discussion).
Method
Participants
Experiment 2 had 64 participants (Males = 9) with ages ranging from 18 to 64
years old (M = 20.84 years, SD = 6.85 years) were randomly assigned to conditions (n =
32 per condition). Participant selection and exclusionary criteria were the same as in
Experiment 1. Participants were tested individually with the experimenter present for the
procedure.
Materials
Word stimuli. Initially, the top 120 synonym pairs were selected from prior
research because they had similarity ratings (Dey, 1969; Hilgard, 1951). However, for
counterbalancing purposes, additional lists were needed, so a total of 960 randomly
selected words (Kucera & Francis, 1967) were added to these words. These words were
given to two independent groups (n = 10): One group rated pairs for similarity, and
another group solved difficult anagrams of each word. These ratings served as the basis
for word selection, where, ultimately, 16 lists of single words were constructed and used
in the experiment. Each list contained 30 words. These lists were balanced for word
frequency and anagram accuracy, with difficult anagram accuracy ranging from 58.0% to
66.7%. This resulted in two similar word pair lists (A-B’) and two dissimilar word pair
lists (A-D) that were rotated across participants. Similar lists (scale: not similar 0 to 3
very similar, see Hilgard, 1951) had average similarity ratings of 2.39 and 2.48, and
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dissimilar lists had average similarity ratings of .32 and .37 (cf. Dey, 1969).
Counterbalancing. Four lists of words were created, which included cue words
and target words for the study and interference phases. The cue words (A) were the same
cue words for all participants, and the study targets (B) changed across participants. For
the interference lists, similar targets (B’) were necessarily yoked to the study targets (B).
For ease, the dissimilar targets (D) also were yoked to the study targets (B). Although the
study (B) and similar targets (B’) did not change across participants, the study (B) and
dissimilar targets (D) changed across participants such that these targets served as study
or dissimilar targets equally often across participants. However, only 60 dissimilar and 60
similar word pairs were shown to a participant at a time. In addition, all A-B word pairs
were interfered with using similar and dissimilar word pairs across participants. Each
participant studied 120 A-B word pairs and then studied a second 120 word-pair list, with
half consisting of similar A-B’ word pairs and the other half consisting of dissimilar A-D
word pairs .
Post-experimental questionnaire. Participants responded on a 10-point scale, with 10
being the highest value and 1 being the lowest value, to the following questions: How
hard did you try to solve the anagrams?; How often did you think about the word pairs
from the pleasantness judgments task?; How difficult did you find the anagram task?;
How often did you think about the word pairs from the anagram task?; During the break
periods, how often did you rest or sleep?; and an open-ended question assessed whether
participants were aware of the similarity manipulation, Did you notice anything about the
word pairs in the anagram task? If so, what did you notice?.
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Procedure
Experiment 2 is briefly outlined in Figure 8. As an overview of the procedure,
participants first were given two practice sessions designed to familiarize them with the
anagram procedure. Then, participants began a pleasantness judgment task, which served
as an incidental learning procedure for the A-B word pairs. Afterward, participants began
the break section, completed the anagram procedure, and then had another break section.
Similarity and mental effort were manipulated within the anagram task. Finally,
participants took an associative recognition test and were given a post-experimental
questionnaire. Then they were debriefed.
Because the anagram task was difficult to understand, the experimenter helped
participants practice the anagram task in two different ways before starting the
pleasantness judgments task. This allowed the experimenter to assess participant
understanding and took approximately 10-15 minutes per participant. The first practice
phase was untimed and allowed the participant to become familiar with applying an
anagram rule (see below) for four trials. The second practice phase was timed and
mimicked the later anagram task for 16 trials, 4 trials for each of the four word lengths
(4-7 letters).
After participants finished practicing, participants were instructed on how to
respond in the pleasantness judgment task. The pleasantness judgment task was the same
as in Experiment 1, except participants read aloud each word pair while making the
pleasantness judgments. This study section lasted eight minutes.
In the retroactive interference phase, using the same instructions as in Experiment
1, participants were told to rest for 10 minutes. Then they heard a sound that signaled the
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start of the anagram task. The experimenter reviewed the anagram task instructions with
the participants, and then pressed the spacebar to begin the anagram task when they were
ready. The experimenter recorded all correct, incorrect, and missed answers, as well as
when participants mispronounced words.
On any given trial in the anagram task, participants first saw and read aloud a cue
word, which was the same as what they saw during study. After 1.5 s, the second-list
target appeared next to the cue, but this target was “hidden” in an anagram. This secondlist target was either similar to (synonym) or dissimilar from the first-list target. Each
second-list target was scrambled according to an easy rule (daisy-icrcle: 213456, woundapper: 21345) or a difficult rule (daisy-iclecr 245613, wound-aerpp: 24513), depending
on the mental effort condition. The rule always appeared below the anagram. Once the
anagram appeared, participants had 4.5 s to solve it and say the answer out loud. After 4.5
s, a neutral sound signaled the end of the trial, and then participants saw the correct
answer on screen for 1.0 s. They read aloud this answer if they did not solve the anagram
in time or if they solved the anagram incorrectly. The anagrams were presented in one of
sixteen fixed random orders to allow the experimenter to record participant responses.
The anagram order was restricted such that no one similarity word type (similar or
dissimilar) appeared more than three times in a row. The anagram task lasted for 15
minutes, after which, participants took a 5-minute break. Then, the participant heard a
sound to signal test onset. The entire retention interval lasted for 30 minutes.
Like Experiment 1, during the test phase, participants rated their confidence in
their decisions about whether intact and rearranged pairs were intact or rearranged. After
the test, participants completed the post-experimental questionnaire, were debriefed, and
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then assigned course credit.
Results
Experiment 2 tested how mental effort and similarity affect recollection and
familiarity estimates in a cue-overload version of the associative recognition task. The
same signal detection measures and process estimates from Experiment 1EXPERIMENT
1 were used in Experiment 2 (see Appendix). To assess how well participants solved
anagrams, an anagram accuracy measure was calculated as the proportion of correctly
solved anagrams.
Data screening and analysis plan
In general, all dependent variables were analyzed in the same way as in
Experiment 1, unless otherwise noted. Within conditions, each dependent variable was
examined for univariate outliers (|z-scores| > 3.29, p < .001), normality assumptions
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, p < .05, visual inspection of histograms, and |skewness| and
|kurtosis| values > 1), homogeneity of variance assumptions (Levene’s test, p < .05), and
sphericity assumptions (Mauchly’s test of sphericity, p < .05).
If the data met parametric assumptions, a 2 x 2 between-within ANOVA was conducted to
examine the interaction between mental effort (between-subjects) and similarity (withinsubjects), and main effects were examined but interpreted in terms of statistically significant
interactions. Planned t-tests were conducted on marginal means and cell means to assess main
effects and interactions, respectively. If the data did not meet parametric assumptions, a nonparametric 2 x 2 between-within ANOVA was conducted on rankings of individual interaction
scores (Leys & Schumann, 2010). Main effects were examined using Mann-Whitney U-tests
(between-subjects: mental effort) and Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (within-subjects: similarity).
Alpha was set at .05 for all tests, and marginal significance was considered if a p-value was
between .05 and .10. Statistics are reported with all participants unless otherwise noted. As
before, descriptive and inferential statistics are presented in Table 3

Table 3 (post-experimental data) and Table 4 (primary measures).
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Post-experimental questionnaire data
As Table 3 shows, the post-experimental questionnaire scores were, for the most
part, unrelated to the manipulations. Non-parametric and parametric independent-samples
comparisons revealed significant differences as a function of anagram difficulty for the
following variables: non-parametric rankings: How difficult did you find the anagram
task?, MDifficult = 43.09 > MEasy = 21.91, p < .0001 ; and marginally significant differences
for How hard did you try to solve the anagrams?, MDifficult = 36.31 and MEasy = 28.69, p
= .090. Thus, participants rated that the difficult anagrams were more difficult than the
easy anagrams.
Anagram accuracy. A Table 3 shows, parametric analyses revealed that
participants solved more easy than difficult anagrams, F(1, 62) = 41.61, p < .0001, ηp2
= .402; more similar than dissimilar anagrams, F(1, 62) = 10.41, p = .002, ηp2 = .144; and
the interaction was also significant, F(1, 62) = 12.95, p = .006, ηp2 = .173. Planned t-tests
revealed significant differences: Similar (MEasy = .968 > MDifficult = .744, t(33.122) = 6.23,
p < .0001); Dissimilar (MEasy = .970 > MDifficult = .692, t(32.723) = 6.42, p < .0001); and
Difficult (MSimilar = .744 > MDissimilar = .692, t(31) = 3.79, p = .001), except for the
difference between anagram accuracy for: Easy (MSimilar = .968 and MDissimilar = .970, t(31)
= -.43, p = .672). This pattern of results suggests that participants solved more easy than
difficult anagrams; however, for difficult anagrams, participants solved more similar than
dissimilar targets, but the same difference was not true for easy anagrams. 4.

Levene’s test was significant, F(1, 62) = 57.9, p < .0001, indicating different variances between groups.
Levene’s test was significant, F(1, 62) = 60.6, p < .0001, indicating different variances between groups.
4 It should be noted that the non-parametric tests revealed a different pattern of results. This likely arose
because of ceiling effects that may have affected the predicted interaction rankings for easy anagrams. The
main effect of anagram difficulty was significant U(128) = 325.00, p < .0001, suggesting that participants
2
3
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Signal-detection and model estimates
Presented next are the signal-detection measures and model estimates (see Error!
Reference source not found.).
da. As Table 4 shows, the main effect of anagram difficulty, of similarity, and the
interaction were not significant, suggesting that da was similar across conditions.
Dual-process signal-detection model fit. As in Experiment 1, descriptive
analyses were conducted to determine whether the estimates derived using the dualprocess signal-detection model were based on a good-fitting model (Yonelinas, 1994).
Within each condition, the percentage of participants for which the dual-process signaldetection model fit the data (p > .05) was calculated. This descriptive analysis revealed
that the model fit the data for all participants across conditions, except for one person in
the Difficult-Similar condition. Statistics with all participants included are reported given
that the results were the same including and excluding that one participant.
Recollection. As Figure 9 shows (see also Table 4), the main effect of anagram
difficulty was marginally significant, U(128) = 1.709, p = .087, with numerically larger
recollection estimates after solving difficult rather than easy anagrams (MDifficult = 70.09 >
MEasy = 58.91). The main effect of similarity and the interaction were not significant.
Recollect-reject. As Figure 10 shows (see also Table 4), the main effect of
anagram difficulty, of similarity, and the interaction were not significant, suggesting that
recollect-reject estimates were similar across conditions.
successfully solved more difficult than easy anagrams. The main effect of similarity was significant, W(64)
= 857.00, p < .01, suggesting that participants solved more dissimilar anagrams than similar anagrams. The
interaction was also significant, suggesting that the above results occurred because participants solved
fewer easy, similar anagrams than any other target type (ps = .0001 to .029). No other significant
differences emerged. These data suggest that average rankings of anagram hit rates were lowest in the easy
similar anagram condition

55

Familiarity. As Figure 11 shows (see also Table 4), the main effect of anagram
difficulty, of similarity, and the interaction were not significant, suggesting that
familiarity estimates were similar across conditions. Listwise exclusion of one outlier and
the participant for which the dual-process signal-model provided a poor fit did not change
the results.
Discussion
The goal of Experiment 2 was to examine whether mental effort and similarity
affect recollection and familiarity estimates in an associative recognition task. To this end,
mental effort was controlled within each level of similarity. Participants solved either
easy or difficult anagrams of cue-overloaded word pairs in which the second-list target
was similar to (synonym) or dissimilar from the first-list target. The results showed
marginal and non-significant effects: The main effect of mental effort on recollection
estimates was marginally significant, but the effect was in the opposite direction of
predictions
Experiment 2 failed to detect similarity effects on any memory measure. One
possible reason why similarity did not cause retroactive interference is because the
current study had participants learn A-D and A-B’ word pairs 10 minutes after study
rather than just before test. Another possible reason is that studying the second-list list
could have produced an equal amount of facilitation and interference. This might be
expected if, for some A-D and A-B’ word pairs, participants noticed and later recollected
the change at test, as was shown in a proactive interference version of the cue-overload
task (Jacoby et al., 2013; Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2012; Wahlheim, 2014). Noticing and
later recollecting change can produce proactive facilitation, whereas failing to recollect
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that change can produce proactive interference. If these proactive interference effects
generalize to similar retroactive interference paradigms, then studying a second list could
produce null cue-overload effects. However, similarity should have made change
detection more difficult, which should increase retroactive interference. It should be
noted, though, that the retroactive interference experiments used orthographically similar
materials, suggesting that change detection effects can occur for similar materials.
In addition to the null similarity effects, the null mental effort effects were
replicated from Experiment 1. One possible reason for the null mental effort effects in
Experiment 2 is that all participants solved anagrams 10 minutes after study rather than
immediately after study. Mental effort effects should be greatest when presented
immediately after study rather than after a delay. However, Experiment 1 showed null
mental effort effects even when presented 0 minutes or 10 minutes after study, suggesting
that a longer delay is necessary (i.e., 20 minutes).
Another possible reason for the null mental effort effects in Experiment 2 is that
the recollection and familiarity estimates in Experiment 2 may have not been accurate
because recollection and familiarity were estimated based on fewer responses than what
is typically recommended (Yonelinas & Parks, 2007). This could have made these
estimates less sensitive to retroactive interference effects. However, although the number
of responses collected differed across experiments, the results were replicated. Thus, the
current results join other studies finding weak or null mental effort effects (Dewar et al.,
2010), suggesting that mental effort may not cause retroactive interference.
The results are consistent with the view that subjective mental effort is not
sufficient to observe retroactive interference. This is supported by the finding across
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experiments that subjective mental effort was present and manipulated successfully, and
retroactive interference was not found. In addition, the results with similarity are not
consistent with past research demonstrating response competition effects. Future research
should account for other factors that may be responsible for detecting retroactive
interference in recognition memory (e.g., remindings and TPI).
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CHAPTER 4
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The goal of this research was to examine some potential causes of retroactive
interference and whether they affect associative recognition memory. Early researchers
found evidence for two causes of retroactive interference, mental effort and similarity.
Mental effort was thought to disrupt consolidation, and similarity was thought to promote
response competition during retrieval. Recent neurological evidence suggests that new
long-term potentiation disrupts old long-term potentiation in the hippocampus, consistent
with the hypothesis that mental effort disrupts consolidation by increasing new long-term
potentiation in the hippocampus. Moreover, similarity may promote response competition,
which should reduce recollection estimates but may or may not affect familiarity
estimates (e.g., Verde, 2004). Finally, learning new material that is similar to old material
may cause retroactive interference because learning new material could have both
specific (e.g., response competition) and nonspecific (e.g., mental effort) effects (Dewar
et al., 2007; Wixted, 2004b), which could lead to an interaction between these two types
of RI.
How Should Mental Effort Be Defined?
The current results do not support the hypothesis that mental effort causes
retroactive interference by disrupting consolidation in the hippocampus. Participants
indicated that they found the mental effort manipulations mentally demanding or difficult
in both experiments. Despite this, mental effort in Experiment 1 decreased recollectreject estimates in some conditions, increased recollect-reject estimates in one TPI
condition, or did not affect recollect-reject estimates in another TPI condition. In addition,
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mental effort did not affect recollection estimates in either experiment. There are several
possibilities for these inconsistent mental effort effects.
Mental effort may not have affected memory in the manner predicted because the
parameters of the experiment were not optimal for detecting those effects. First, the
mental effort tasks used in the current experiments lasted eight minutes (Experiment 1) or
15 minutes (Experiment 2), whereas previous studies used shorter durations of mental
effort (e.g., 3 minutes, Skaggs, 1925). Thus, mental effort may have been at its upper
limit—though this seems unlikely given that overall memory performance was similar
across conditions. Second, the retention interval length in the current experiments lasted
30 minutes, whereas previous studies used shorter retention intervals—six minutes
(Dewar et al., 2007; Müller & Pilzecker, 1900; Skaggs, 1925). Memories would
consolidate less within six minutes than within 30-minutes (the current study), making
them more vulnerable to retroactive interference. Third, and finally, recognition tasks are
usually easier than recall or cued-recall tasks, which may have reduced sensitivity of the
current measures to retroactive interference effects. Nevertheless, recall and recognition
may share a common set of underlying processes, which may be related to the degree to
which recollection is diagnostic of task performance (Okada et al., 2012; Yonelinas,
2002). Thus, mental effort should have caused retroactive interference, at least in terms of
overall performance or for recollection estimates, but this was not found. Understanding
the boundary conditions of mental effort effects is important for constraining theorizing
about mental effort as a cause of retroactive interference.
Another possibility is that mental effort may not cause retroactive interference.
Although Wixted (2004b) treats mental effort as nonspecific retroactive interference that

60

disrupts consolidation in the hippocampus, mental effort—the subjective mental demand
of a task—does not seem to cause retroactive interference, at least in the current
experiments. Moreover, if mental effort effects have an upper limit or if mental effort
causes more retroactive interference in shorter than in longer retention intervals, then
these boundary conditions suggest that mental effort may be limited in how much
everyday forgetting it can explain.
Temporal Point of Interpolation and Consolidation
In contrast to the inconsistent mental effort effects, TPI affected recollection
estimates but not familiarity estimates. The TPI effect is consistent with past research
demonstrating a temporal gradient of RI (Wixted, 2004b). This past research showed
more forgetting when new material was learned immediately after study compared to a
delay. Thus, this TPI effect is consistent with the hypothesis that nonspecific tasks can
disrupt consolidation in the hippocampus (Wixted, 2004b). These findings extend past
research showing weak TPI effects in controls (Dewar et al., 2010, 2009), which used a
10-minute retention interval. The current experiments found no differences between 0and 10-minute retention intervals: a 20-minute retention interval increased recollection
estimates. In addition, this TPI effect is consistent with research demonstrating that slowwave sleep rather than REM sleep selectively benefited recollection estimates (Daurat et
al., 2007). Thus, the TPI effect specific to recollection is consistent with the hypothesis
that nonspecific tasks can disrupt consolidation in the hippocampus.
The TPI effect is also consistent with past research on forgetting curves.
Ebbinghaus found that the proportion of forgotten information continually decreases over
time (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1913). Moreover, the same mathematical function describes
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forgetting curves using different retention intervals and materials (Wixted, 2004a; Wixted
& Ebbesen, 1991). This suggests that memories consolidate over time, becoming
increasingly less susceptible to retroactive interference (Ebbinghaus, 1885; Jenkins &
Dallenbach, 1924; Wixted, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2010). Thus, the ever-decreasing
forgetting rate suggests that consolidation increasingly protects memories from
retroactive interference over time. If, as Experiment 1 suggests, consolidation is more
related to recollection than familiarity, then forgetting curves for recollection and
familiarity should differ. One study showed that recollection estimates derived from
introspective reports decreased quickly from 0 to 7 days but did not change from 7 and 14
days (Tunney, 2010). By contrast, familiarity estimates were stable across these same
time periods. These data suggest that the forgetting curve for recollection estimates might
differ from the forgetting curve for familiarity estimates, at least for these three retention
intervals. However, other research suggests that this pattern might not be typical
(Gardiner & Java, 1991; Hockley & Consoli, 1999; Yonelinas, 2002). Limitations of
introspective judgments notwithstanding (McCabe, Geraci, Boman, Sensenig, & Rhodes,
2011), forgetting curves for recollection and familiarity estimates may also be
confounded with differences in memory strength, with recollection-driven memory
generally being stronger than familiarity-driven memory (Yonelinas, 2002). Future
research should establish the temporal gradients (e.g., forgetting curves) of recollection
and familiarity estimates (e.g., derived from dual-process signal detection model) equated
for overall memory strength (e.g., high-confidence recollection and familiarity) to
determine the relative importance of consolidation (e.g., Wixted, 2004b), or RI, to
recollection and familiarity.
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One main limitation of the current experiments is that the TPI effect could have
occurred because participants rehearsed new material more during the 20-minute
condition than during other TPI conditions. While this cannot be completely ruled out,
there are several reasons why this explanation seems unlikely. First, participants studied
word pairs under incidental learning instructions. Second, the experimenter was with the
participant throughout the procedure, and there was no evidence of overt rehearsal
(though this does not rule out covert rehearsal). Third, rehearsal ratings were similar in all
conditions. If these ratings indexed rehearsal, then there were little to no differences in
amount of rehearsal across conditions. Fourth, recollection estimates were worse in the
control condition than in the 20-minute condition. If participants were expected to
rehearse more during a longer than a shorter break, then this condition should have been
associated with increased recollection estimates (though this condition should have been
associated with increased estimates for other reasons, too). Fifth, and finally, some
participants spontaneously indicated that they were surprised that there was a test after
the experiment, though this was not measured explicitly. Future studies might directly ask
participants whether they knew a test was coming and if they prepared in any way for it.
Therefore, the current results are most consistent with a consolidation hypothesis, such
that a nonspecific task meant to induce retroactive interference disrupted consolidation
necessary for recollection.
Similarity
In Experiment 2, similarity did not affect recollection or familiarity estimates.
Similarity was manipulated by having participants study similar and dissimilar word pairs
(A-B’ vs. A-D) 10-minutes after studying a list of A-B word pairs in an associative
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recognition task. Past research has shown that increasing the number of competing
responses decreases recollection hits and increases familiarity hits and false alarms in an
associative recognition task (Verde, 2004). Given this, it was expected that response
competition effects would have been greater under similar than dissimilar conditions (AB’ vs. A-D). However, no evidence of retroactive interference was found. There are
several possibilities for why no similarity effect was found.
One reason for the null similarity effect may be that the A-D and A-B’ lists were
not studied close enough to retrieval. Past research has shown that studying the second
list closer to retrieval increases response competition effects (J. R. Anderson, 1974;
McGeoch, 1942; Newton & Wickens, 1956; Postman & Alper, 1946; Wixted, 2004b). In
Experiment 2, participants studied the interfering word pair list 10 minutes after study.
The reason for this choice was to increase the ability to detect a potential mental effort by
similarity interaction, at a point where mental effort or response competition did not
dominate the other. Using a similar design, reducing the retention interval length from 30
minutes to 20 minutes could increase similarity effects because the second list would be
learned closer to retrieval. In addition, the interaction might be more likely to be detected
because the mental effort and similarity effects would likely be stronger. Reducing
retention interval length could also reduce factors contributing to random error (e.g.
participant thoughts).
Another possible reason for the null similarity effects is that similarity may have
been at its upper limit (see Figure 2; Harden, 1929; Robinson, 1927). Indeed, increasing
similarity by increasing synonymy of second-list targets reduced RI effects in a cued
recall task, consistent with the far left x-axis of Skaggs similarity curve (see Figure 1;
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Gladis & Braun, 1958). However, Experiment 2 did not detect retroactive facilitation or
retroactive interference, so it is unclear how similarity affected performance in the
current experiments.
Another possible reason for the null similarity effects is that similarity could
facilitate or interfere with memory in the cue-overload paradigm, depending on the
detection of change, which could result in null overall effects (e.g., Wahlheim & Jacoby,
2011, 2013). In a proactive interference version of the cue-overload paradigm,
participants who detected change (A-B vs A-D) and successfully recollected that change
at test showed proactive facilitation. However, when change recollection was
unsuccessful, participants showed typical proactive interference effects (Jacoby et al.,
2013). The authors surmised that once change was detected, the memory of the A-B word
pair became integrated with the memory for the A-D word pair, preserving temporal
order, such that, when cued at test, participants later recollected that change at test. This
was called a recursive reminding because the test pair reminded the participant of the
previous reminding during the interference phase. Thus, although there were no overall
effects after learning interfering a list of A-D and C-D word pairs, this null effect could
have reflected a mix of both proactive facilitation and interference effects that depended
on successful change recollection.
If the proactive effects that depend on change recollection generalize to similar
retroactive interference paradigms, then performance in the current experiments also
could reflect a mix of retroactive facilitation and interference. When presented A-D or AB’ word pairs in the current experiments, participants could have detected and later
recollected the change between some items but not others. If change recollection
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occurred in Experiment 2, increasing the similarity between first- and second-list targets
should have decreased change detection, which would have decreased the probability of
change recollection. This would have increased retroactive interference —but retroactive
interference was not found in Experiment 2. It should be noted, however, that change
recollection was demonstrated with orthographically similar materials (e.g., knee-bone vs.
knee-bend). However, the effect of similarity on change recollection has not been
systematically investigated.
Future research should help clarify the role of remindings in retroactive
interference and proactive interference, especially because remindings may represent a
large proportion of everyday memory (Hintzman, 2011). A remindings hypothesis dates
back to Müller and Pilzecker’s (1900) theory of retroactive interference. This theory
claimed that spontaneous (and uncued) remindings retroactively facilitated memory by
promoting consolidation (Müller & Pilzecker, 1900, as cited in Lechner et al., 1999). By
contrast, the recursive remindings hypothesis claims that recursive remindings (cued)
proactively facilitate memory by preserving the temporal order of old and new memories,
as explained above. The role of spontaneous remindings in facilitating consolidation has
not been tested, probably because they could be viewed as rehearsal (for example,
Wixted, 2004b called spontaneous remindings “spontaneous rehearsal”). Nonetheless,
remindings—whether cued or uncued—could facilitate memory in a way different than
rehearsal. As the proactive interference research suggests, remindings could facilitate
memory through memory integration processes. As the original theory of retroactive
interference suggests, remindings could also facilitate consolidation of old material.
These possibilities should be explored further in both retroactive interference and
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proactive interference tasks and in recall and recognition tasks. Differences between
recall and recognition tasks could help answer the question of whether learning new
material affects the underlying memory or access to that memory.
Choice of Model
The current studies derived recollection and familiarity estimates using the dualprocess signal-detection model (Yonelinas, 1994, 2002). It is possible that the
assumptions of the dual-process signal-detection model constrained the sensitivity of
recollection and familiarity estimates to retroactive interference. However, retroactive
interference did not occur in da, a measure of overall discrimination that accounts for
differences in the variances of the old and new memory strength distributions (Macmillan
& Creelman, 2005). This suggests that the choice of model was not at issue because
retroactive interference was not detected in overall performance.
A related point is that if the assumptions underlying the model were not valid,
recollection and familiarity estimates might be inaccurate. As an illustration, if
recollection was continuous (like familiarity)—that is recollected information varies in
memory strength—then there would be variations in confidence (Ratcliff, Sheu, &
Gronlund, 1992). If the dual-process signal detection model estimated recollection as a
probability, the resulting sample estimate would underestimate true recollection because
the estimate would only capture high-confidence responses (rather than also including the
lower-confidence responses). However, this may not have been an issue because
familiarity was associated with all confidence responses, and there was no effect of
mental effort on familiarity. Thus, it seems unlikely that the specific assumptions of the
model were related to the mental effort effects observed in the current experiments.
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A final point to consider is model fit, which was good for most subjects in both
experiments (see Results). If the model fit were poor, the parameter estimates might be
less sensitive to retroactive interference. However, visual inspection of responses and the
descriptive analyses reported earlier suggest that the dual-process signal-detection model
fit the data well. This suggests that recollection and familiarity were estimated
appropriately. Therefore, the current data do not suggest that the choice of model
compromised power.
Concluding Remarks
In the beginning of his review article, Wixted (2004b) noted that the standard
story of forgetting “has changed over the years from a theoretically coherent (and
ultimately incorrect) interference-based account of forgetting to an atheoretical laundry
list of factors that may or may not play a role” (p. 236). In the endeavor to better
understand everyday forgetting, the current experiments examined mental effort and
similarity effects in recognition memory: There was a temporal effect of learning new
material on recollection estimates. This is consistent with the notion that nonspecific
retroactive interference disrupts consolidation specifically for hippocampally-driven
memory processes (e.g. Daurat et al., 2007). The current experiments also showed that
subjective mental effort, in and of itself, probably does not cause retroactive interference,
though further experimentation on the boundary conditions of mental effort is necessary
to firmly support this conclusion.
As Wixted (2004b) supposed, it may be that nonspecific tasks cause RI only to
the extent that they increase new long-term potentiation in the hippocampus (cf. Dewar et
al., 2007). If true, it may be difficult to find manipulations that reliably increase new
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long-term potentiation in the hippocampus, though, rat research suggests that exposure to
novel environments increase new long-term potentiation in the hippocampus (Ballarini,
Moncada, Martinez, Alen, & Viola, 2009; Martínez, Alen, Ballarini, Moncada, & Viola,
2012; Wixted, 2004b). Future research should establish manipulations that link
nonspecific tasks to retroactive interference via hippocampal new long-term potentiation
(e.g., exposure to virtual novel environments).
If remindings are important in proactive interference tasks, they may also be
important in retroactive interference tasks. Thus, future research should investigate the
roles of nonspecific retroactive interference, similarity, and remindings in recall and
recognition to better understand when learning new material increases retroactive
facilitation—via memory integration and consolidation—and increases retroactive
interference—via disrupting memory access or the underlying memory representations.
Over 100 years have passed since Müller and Pilzecker (1900) discovered retroactive
interference, yet the basic processes underlying forgetting remain to be fully uncovered.
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Table
Table 1
Inferential and Descriptive Statistics for Post-Experimental Questionnaire Ratings and Math Accuracy as a Function
of Mental Effort and Temporal Point of Interpolation (Experiment 1)
Unfilled
Easy Math Problems
Omnibus χ2(2)
DV

TPI

**ME x TPI

Control

34.13(.35)b

1.90(.09)

1.14(.02)

2.85(1.87)

Rehearsal

0.46(.04)

1.35(.08)

0.48(.01)

Sleep

2.13(.09)

0.17(.03)

AMAS

*0.02(.00)

Math %

*157.62(.58)b

Mental effort

ME

0 Min

10 Min

Difficult Math Problems

20 Min

0 Min

10 Min

20 Min

2.30(1.45) 1.70(1.17)a

1.60(.94)†

3.70(1.84)

3.30(1.53)

3.75(1.68)

2.15(1.53)

2.05(1.76)

1.95(1.28)

2.10(1.86)

2.10(1.86)

1.85(1.18)

2.70(1.98)

0.42(.01)

2.40(1.93)

2.90(1.97)

3.05(2.14)

3.05(1.82)

2.95(1.86)

2.70(1.72)

2.40(1.96)

**0.04(.00)

0.08(.00)

2.80(.70)

2.82(.68)

2.81(1.01)

2.90(.67)

2.87(.58)

2.82(.72)

2.82(.73)

**0.43(.01)

0.60(.01)

--

0.99(.01)

0.99(.01)

0.99(.01)

0.73(.20)

0.68(.16)

0.67(.20)

Note. All inferential statistics were non-parametric, unless otherwise noted. The Omnibus section shows omnibus χ 2 tests (or F-tests). Parenthetical
information shows measures of effect size (Cramer’s V for χ2 and ηp2 for F-tests). The symbols for significance values in the Unfilled and math problems
sections are based on planned comparisons to the unfilled condition. Means (standard deviations) are reported for ease of interpretation.
DV = Dependent variable; ME = Mental effort (main effect); TPI = Temporal point of interpolation (main effect); ME x TPI = Mental effort x temporal
point of interpolation (interaction); Mental effort = "How mentally demanding was the break?"; Rehearsal = "How frequently did the word pairs your
studied come to mind during the break?"; Sleep = "Please rate your sleep intensity during the break."; AMAS = Abbreviate Math Anxiety Scale scores;
Math % = Math accuracy.
*F(2, 137) reported for parametric tests
**F(2, 114) reported for parametric tests
†: .05 < p < .10
a: p < .05
b: p < .0001
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Table 2
Inferential and Descriptive Statistics for Signal-Detection Measures and Model Estimates as a Function of Mental Effort and
Temporal Point of Interpolation (Experiment 1)
Omnibus χ2(2)
DV
da
R
RReject
Fam (d')

ME
TPI
*0.26(.00) **0.97(.02)
0.08(.02)
7.94(.18)a
5.54(.14)†
3.62(.12)
1.79(.08)
0.28(.03)

**ME x TPI
0.46(.01)
0.05(.00)
5.60(.09)b
0.15(.00)

Unfilled
Control
1.35(.76)
0.42(.26)
0.13(.14)
0.64(.57)

Easy Math Problems
0 Min
10 Min
20 Min
1.51(.61)
1.34(.74)
1.57(.48)
0.39(.22)
0.38(.24)
0.52(.21)
a
0.09(.12)
0.03(.12)
0.07(.13)†
0.91(.64)
0.80(.69)
0.75(.52)

Difficult Math Problems
0 Min
10 Min
20 Min
1.35(.62)
1.44(.57)
1.59(.74)
0.38(.25)
0.39(.28)
0.52(.24)
a
0.05(.11)
0.14(.16) 0.03(.06)b
0.75(.63)
0.70(.48)
0.78(.77)

Note. All inferential statistics were non-parametric, unless otherwise noted. The Omnibus section shows omnibus χ 2 tests (or F-tests). Parenthetical
information shows measures of effect size (Cramer’s V for χ2 and ηp2 for F-tests). The symbols for significance values in the unfilled and math
problems sections are based on uncorrected multiple comparisons to the unfilled condition. Means (standard deviations) reported for ease of
interpretation.
DV = Dependent variable; ME = mental effort; TPI = temporal point of interpolation; R = Recollection; RReject = Recollect-reject; Fam (d') =
Familiarity estimate; Accuracy = Overall accuracy; da = Discrimination; HR = Overall hit rate; FAR = Overall false alarm rate.
*F(2, 137)
**F(2, 114)
†: .05 < p < .10
a: p < .05
b: p < .01
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Table 3
Inferential and Descriptive Statistics for Post-Experimental
Questionnaire Ratings as a Function of Mental Effort
(Experiment 2)
DV
Sleep
Difficulty
Trying
AnagReh
StudyReh

U(64)
413.5
851.0a
634.0†
503.5
452.0

Easy Anagrams
5.81(3.14)
3.97(2.25)
7.06(3.23)
5.03(2.65)
6.44(2.59)

Difficult Anagrams
4.72(3.22)
6.88(1.93)
8.94(1.08)
5.00(3.12)
5.88(2.41)

Note. All inferential statistics were Mann-Whitney U-tests. Means
(standard deviations) reported for ease of interpretation.
DV = Dependent variable; Sleep = "During the break periods, how
often did you rest or sleep?"; Difficulty = "How difficult did you
find the anagram task?"; Trying = "How hard did you try to solve
the anagrams?"; AnagReh = "How often did you think about the
word pairs from the anagram task?"; and StudyReh = "How often
did you think about the word pairs from the pleasantness judgments
task?".
† = .05 < p < .10
a: p < .0001
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Table 4
Inferential and Descriptive Statistics for Anagram Hit Rates, Signal-Detection Measures, and
Model Estimates as a Function of Anagram Difficulty and Synonymy (Experiment 2)
Omnibus U(128), W(64), or F(1,62)
DV
*AnagHR
Accuracy
HR
FAR
da
R
RReject
Fam (d')

AD
41.61(.40)b
2161.50
2318.50
2125.00
2199.50
2405.50†
2089.00
1969.00

SYN
10.41(.14)a
37.00
35.00
32.00
1237.50
904.00
665.00
733.00

*AD x SYN
16.84(.21)b
1.49(.02)
0.71(.01)
0.91(.02)
1.29(.02)
0.50(.01)
0.26(.00)
0.11(.00)

Easy Anagrams
Unrelated
Related
0.97(.04)
0.97(.04)
0.65(.10)
0.65(.10)
0.67(.17)
0.67(.17)
0.37(.18)
0.37(.17)
0.87(.53)
0.86(.52)
0.26(.20)
0.25(.22)
0.11(.15)
0.09(.13)
0.39(.43)
0.42(.45)

Difficult Anagrams
Unrelated
Related
0.69(.24)
0.74(.20)
0.65(.10)
0.68(.10)
0.70(.12)
0.73(.11)
0.40(.16)
0.37(.16)
0.90(.49)
1.04(.55)
0.31(.20)
0.32(.21)
0.08(.11)
0.11(.14)
0.35(.45)
0.46(.55)

Note. All inferential statistics were non-parametric. Omnibus section shows values of omnibus MannWhitney U-tests (anagram difficulty), Wilcoxon Sign-Ranked Test (synonymy), or non-parametric
interaction (F-tests). Parenthetical information shows effect sizes only for F-tests using ηp2. anagrams
sections shows means (standard deviations) for ease of interpretation.
AD = anagram difficulty; SYN = synonymy; DV = Dependent variable; AnagHR = Anagram hit rate;
Accuracy = Overall accuracy; HR = Overall hit rate; FAR = Overall false alarm rate; da = discrimination;
R = Recollection; RReject = Recollect-reject; Fam (d') = Familiarity estimate.
*F(1, 62)
†: .05 < p < .10
a: p < .01
b: p < .0001
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Figures

Figure 1. Theoretical inverted-U relationship between memory performance and the
temporal point of interpolation (Wixted, 2004b). Memory performance is expected to be
lower for when nonspecific retroactive interference occurs in the middle of a retention
interval compared to when it occurs near encoding or near retrieval.
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Figure 2. The Skaggs Hypothesis. This figure shows the relationships between retroactive
facilitation and interference as a function of similarity between old and new materials
(Skaggs, 1925; and later, Robinson, 1927). On the far-left x-axis, increasing similarity
increases retroactive facilitation. In the middle of the x-axis, increasing similarity
increases retroactive interference. Finally, on the far-right x-axis, even dissimilar stimuli
can cause retroactive interference because of mental effort (Müller & Pilzecker, 1900;
Skaggs, 1925; 1933; Wixted, 2004a).
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Figure 3. Retroactive Interference Model Adapted from Dewar, Cowan, and Della Sala
(2007, Figure 15, p. 632). After encoding a stimulus (daisy), the memory consolidates
and becomes increasingly less susceptible to retroactive interference. New material can
vary in similarity, from highly dissimilar (89 – 6 = ?) to highly similar (lily). If similarity
is high, the responses may compete when probed during retrieval, which is called
response competition, In addition, learning similar or dissimilar material may be mentally
effortful and may disrupt hippocampal consolidation.
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Figure 4. Experiment 1 Procedure. Participants judged the pleasantness of 120 word pairs.
Mental effort was manipulated between-subjects by having participants solve either easy
problems (e.g., 1 + 3 = ?) or difficult problems (e.g., 83 – 9 = ?). Additionally, the
temporal point of interpolation was manipulated between-subjects by having participants
solve math problems either 0, 10, or 20 minutes after study. Participants in the control
(unfilled) condition rested for 30 minutes. Participants then rated their confidence in
decisions about whether word pairs were intact or rearranged, they completed a postexperimental questionnaire (see Methods), and then they were debriefed.
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Figure 5. Recollection Estimates in Experiment 1. Estimates are plotted as a function of
math problem difficulty, rest (unfilled), and the temporal point of interpolation. Bars are
+ 1 standard error of the mean.
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Figure 6. Recollect-Reject Estimates in Experiment 1. Estimates are plotted as a function
of math problem difficulty, unfilled (control), and the temporal point of interpolation.
Bars are + 1 standard error of the mean.
*p < .05 for follow-up, Mann-Whitney U-tests (uncorrected)
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Figure 7. Familiarity (d’) Estimates in Experiment 1. Estimates are plotted as a function
of math problem difficulty, rest (unfilled), and the temporal point of interpolation. Bars
are + 1 standard error of the mean.
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Figure 8. Experiment 2 Procedure. Participants read aloud and judged the pleasantness of
120 word pairs (daisy-sphere, wound-teeth). Mental effort was manipulated betweensubjects and required participants to solve either easy (daisy-icrcle) or difficult (daisyiclecr) anagrams. The anagram targets were synonyms (daisy-circle) or unrelated words
(wound-paper) to the studied targets. Participants then rated their confidence in decisions
about whether word pairs were intact or rearranged, they completed a post-experimental
questionnaire (see Methods), and then they were debriefed

81

Figure 9. Recollection Estimates in Experiment 2. Estimates are plotted as a function of
anagram difficulty and synonymy. Bars are + 1 standard error of the mean.
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Figure 10. Recollect-Reject Estimates in Experiment 2. Estimates are plotted as a
function of anagram difficulty and synonymy. Bars are + 1 standard error of the mean.
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Figure 11. Familiarity (d’) Estimates in Experiment 2. Estimates are plotted as a function
of anagram difficulty and synonymy. Bars are + 1 standard error of the mean.
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APPENDIX A
The following sections discuss, in brief a) the dependent variables derived from
signal detection theory (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) and b) how recollection and
familiarity process estimates were derived from the dual-process signal-detection model
in an associative recognition test.
Signal detection theory
Signal detection theory applied to recognition memory allows researchers to
separate measures of discrimination from response criteria, which are derived from two
classes of responses to two classes of items. Discrimination is the ability to tell apart two
classes of items; response criterion is a subjective threshold that represents the
willingness to respond a certain way. In associative recognition memory tasks,
participants respond “intact” or “rearranged” to intact and rearranged items (see Method).
Hit rates measure the probability of correct responses to intact word pairs, and false alarm
rates measure the probability of incorrect responses to rearranged word pairs.
Hit rates and false alarm rates are related to discrimination (e.g., da) and response
criterion (c) in the following manner. Discrimination is a standardized measure of the
difference between hit rates and false alarms rates; response criterion is a standardized
measure of the negative average of the hit rates and false alarm rates. Large positive
standardized differences between hit rate and false alarm rate represent good
discrimination; parallel changes in hit rates and false alarm rates reflect changes in
response criteria (i.e., more or less willing to respond “intact”). Separating discrimination
from response bias is important because standard performance measures, such as
accuracy, confound them.
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Dual-Process Signal-Detection Model Process Estimates
The dual-process signal-detection model assumes that recollection occurs
probabilistically across items, and when successful, the subject retrieves associative
information about the item with high confidence. For intact items, this increases hit rates;
for rearranged items, this increases correct rejections (i.e., 1 – False Alarm Rate),
resulting in two measures of recollection: recollect-accept (henceforth, called recollection)
and recollect-reject. Familiarity, by contrast, is a continuous signal-detection process, and
so familiarity is estimated as a discrimination measure, or d’. For intact items, familiarity
increases hits; for rearranged items, familiarity increases false alarms. Based on these
relationships between hit rates and false alarm rates, the model relies on variations in
response confidence that represent variations in response bias to compute estimates of
recollection, recollect-reject, and familiarity (d’).
To estimate the relative contributions of recollection and familiarity to associative
recognition test performance, an iterative maximum likelihood estimation procedure was
used. Estimates were derived from an unpublished Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, authored
by Colleen M. Parks. This procedure works by calculating the maximum likelihood
estimate of recollection and familiarity given observed hit rates and false alarm rates.
The likelihood value is calculated using G2 based on the differences between observed
and predicted hit rates and false alarms. These likelihood values are summed and then
maximized using the Solver Add-in to yield the most likely recollection (R), recollectreject, and familiarity (d’) estimates given the data. To assess model fit, a χ2 value is
calculated (which is an approximation of G2) and is tested against the critical χ 2(2) (=
3.84). If the observed χ2 exceeds the critical χ 2(2), then the model fit is rejected at p < .05,
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indicating poor model fit. It is important to note that the dual-process signal-detection
model was fit to individual subject data rather than group averages. Past research has
suggested that fitting to average rather than individual data inaccurately represents the
true outcome (Malmberg & Xu, 2006; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007).
There are also certain constraints imposed on parameter estimates during the
model-fitting procedures. Familiarity (d’) was constrained to be no less than 0 (chance
performance), and R and RReject were constrained to be between .000001 and .999999.
These constraints were in place when estimating all parameters. For familiarity, negative
d’ is unlikely because it means the participant had below chance performance (i.e.,
practically, they may have reversed the scale). For recollection, probabilities of less than
0 or greater than 1 are not possible because they are probabilities.
An additional consideration, however, comes from Macmillan and Creelman
(2005) who, while discussing whether one should include negative d’ values in statistical
analyses, suggested that only including d’ values greater than 0 may inflate the true, or
population, d’ (p. 15). That is, negative d’ values may arise from sampling error when
calculated over a small number of trials. When averaged over subjects, the negative
values would be incorporated into a less biased population estimate. Otherwise, the
estimate will be inflated. However, this is not the accepted means anymore because it
allows for model overfitting that may produce nonsensical estimates. From the former
perspective, constraining parameter estimates may result in biased estimates, whereas
from the latter perspective, constraints may produce more sensible estimates without
overfitting sample data. The latter perspective was taken in the current experiments.
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